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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000999

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TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU MOPS

SUBJECT: DPKO: SUDAN QUIETLY SLOWING COMPONENTS OF UNAMID

REF: A. 06 USUN 01911

1B. KHARTOUM 01720

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 B/D.

11. (C) SUMMARY: UN Department of Peacekeeping Officials have reported to USUN that the Government of Sudan (GOS) is hindering UNAMID deployment in a variety of ways. Per DPKO, Sudanese officials have delayed agreement on force composition, failed to facilitate land and water rights in many areas, changed visas procedures to delay deployment of UN personnel, seized shipments of UN equipment and hindered clearances for UN aircraft. DPKO officials assess these behaviors as most consistent with a passive strategy of delaying UNAMID deployment without showing official obstruction. END SUMMARY.

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GOS Slow Rolling  
Agreement on UN/AU TCC List  
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12. (C) According to DPKO, the Government of Sudan's (GOS) primary strategy for delaying UNAMID deployment has been refusing to finalize the UN-AU TCC list. The UN-AU TCC list was provided to the GOS on October 2. To date, the GOS has not provided an official response. (NOTE: Normally, the UN provides a list of the TCCs to the host country as a formality before deployment. In the case of UNAMID, however, many TCCs have been unwilling to deploy without the explicit approval of the GOS because of Sudan's history of threatening TCCs (ref A). END NOTE.)

13. (C) Informally, the Sudanese have objected to UNAMID participation by several non-African countries: Norway (Engineer Company, composed of Swedish and Norwegian troops) Nepal (Infantry) and Thailand (Infantry). The Sudanese objections were communicated to DPKO during working-level meetings in Khartoum October 8 and 9. According to DPKO, the Sudanese Mission to the United Nations has also spoken directly to these TCCs in New York to discourage deployment.

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Land and Water Rights  
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14. (C) UN officials report limited cooperation in regard to land and water rights from the GOS. The UN requested land for bases in al-Genina, Zulinjah, Nyala, al-Fasher in August 12008. The GOS has facilitated the provision of land in Nyala, al-Fasher and Zulinjah. In Zulinjah, however, DPKO assesses that the offered land is inadequate because it lacks an adequate supply of water. In regard to al-Genina, the GOS

has not yet completed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for UN use of the land, but DPKO expects this to be resolved soon.

¶ 15. (C) The UN has acquired water and drilling rights in most of Darfur except for Western Darfur. However the process has been very slow, taking much longer than the standard of 30-45 days. DPKO assesses that the foot-dragging is a combination of local Wali recalcitrance as well as GOS influence. DPKO officials have said that it is often difficult for them to assess whether local delays on water and land rights reflect the influence of Sudanese national authorities.

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New Visa Procedures  
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¶ 16. (C) DPKO officials believe that Sudanese visa procedures were recently changed with the specific purpose of slowing the deployment of UN personnel. Until August 2007, the GOS issued visas to all UN personnel upon arrival in Khartoum. UN officials must now be issued visas in their home countries. DPKO officials have said that it often takes the Sudanese Mission in New York as long as two weeks to process visas for UN officials. GOS officials have already begun blaming the UN for failing to follow the new bureaucratic procedures (ref B).

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NISS Officers Hindering  
Delivery of Equipment  
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¶ 17. (C) According to DPKO, the GOS officials disrupted delivery of the first batch of technical equipment bound for USUN NEW Y 00000999 002 OF 002

Darfur. DPKO officials reported that on October 12 National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) personnel at al-Fasher Airport seized 5 VSAT antennae destined for UNAMID. Subsequently on November 5, NISS personnel reportedly seized a shipment of radios and computer equipment at Khartoum airport. In both cases, UN officials have called Sudanese officials in New York and Khartoum to protest the equipment seizures. GOS officials have described the incidents as customs problems. DPKO officials believe the fact that NISS officials, rather than customs or airport officials, seized the equipment indicates an official effort to delay UN deployment.

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Air Clearances/Night Flights  
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¶ 18. (C) According to DPKO, host countries normally issue a blanket diplomatic clearance for all peacekeeping related flights. The GOS, however, has refused to do so, insisting on granting clearances on an individual basis. In many cases, the clearance only comes at the last minute, thereby compressing the workload and greatly decreasing efficiency.

¶ 19. (C) The GOS continues to maintain a restriction on night flights by UN aircraft. This adversely affects UN operations by limiting the flight window to approximately 8 hours a day.

According to DPKO, the GOS claims that the restriction is a function of inadequate infrastructure at Khartoum and Nyala airports. DPKO believes that this is not accurate and could be resolved if the GOS had the political will to do so.

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COMMENT  
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¶ 110. (C) Assessing GOS cooperation with UNAMID deployment is a complicated task because of the many UN offices and various Sudanese national and local authorities responsible for coordination with UNAMID deployment.

¶11. (C) DPKO assesses that President Bashir's strategy is to slow-roll UNAMID deployment in every way possible but without showing official obstruction. On a case-by-case basis these issues do not seem significant, but when taken in their entirety they succeed in creating layers of delay in an already complicated deployment.

Khalilzad